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et al.: Gift Or Loan Of State Money

GIFT OR LOAN OF STATE MONEY
N. Y. CoNsT. art. VII, § 11:
[Nbo debt shall be hereafter contracted by or in behalf of the
No such
state unless such debt shall be authorized by law ....
law shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have
been submitted to the people, and have received a majority of all
votes castfor and against it at such election ....
N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 8, cl. 1:
The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid
of any private corporationor association, orprivate undertaking;
nor shall the credit of the state be given or loaned to or in aid of
any individual, or public or private corporation or association,
or private undertakng ....

N.Y. CoNsT. art.X, § 5.
Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall at
any time be liable for the payment of any obligations issued
by... a public corporationheretofore or hereafter created, nor
may the legislature accept, authorize acceptance of or impose
such liability upon the state or any politicalsubdivision thereof.

N.Y. CoNsr. art. VII, § 4(c):
Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, no county,
city, town, village or school districtdescribedin this section shall
be allowed to contract indebtedness for any purpose or in any
manner ....
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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT

Colonial Life Insurance Co. of America v. Curiale1
(decided October 13, 1994)

Plaintiff, a commercial insurance company engaged in issuing
health insurance policies to small groups, brought an article 78
proceeding against the New York State Superintendent of
Insurance claiming that a pooling system he created violated
articles 1,2 V113 and XVI4 of the New York State Constitution in
that it took property absent just compensation, illegally gave
private organizations money from the State, and imposed an
unconstitutional tax. 5 The Appellate Division, Third Department,
held that the pooling system was constitutional.

6

It decided that it

was a regulation instead of a tax, the State did not unjustly take
money from the plaintiff, and there was no unauthorized money
7
given to private organizations.

In 1992, chapter 501 of the Laws of 19928 was enacted which
created section 3231 of the Insurance Law. 9 Subdivision (a) of
this section made it mandatory for a commercial insurer in New

1. 205 A.D.2d 58, 617 N.Y.S.2d 377 (3d Dep't 1994).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). This provision states: "Private property
shall not be taken for the public use without just compensation." Id.
3. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8(1). This provision states in pertinent part,
"[tihe money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid of any
private corporation or association, or private undertaking." Id.
4. N.Y. CONST. art.. XVI, § 1. This provision states in pertinent part:
"The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspdnded or contracted
away, except as to securities issued for public purposes pursuant to law. Any
laws which delegate taxing power shall specify the types of taxes which may
be imposed thereunder and provide for their review." Id.
5. Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
6. Id. at 63-64, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
7. Id.
8. 1992 N.Y. LAws 501.
9. N.Y. INs. LAW § 3231 (McKinney 1992).
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York to provide "open enrollment" 10 thereby affording anyone
the ability to obtain an insurance policy and to use a "community
rating" 11 in setting their insurance premiums. 12 The intent
behind this statute was to make insurance rates more stable and to
spread the risk of loss more evenly. 13 The Superintendent was
then ordered to create regulations to implement this objective. 14
In response, the Superintendent created parts 360 and 361 of
chapter 11 of New York City Rules and Regulations [hereinafter
NYCRR]. 15 These regulations collectively created a pooling
16
system requiring insurers to split the risk of high priced claims.
The system contrasted the insurers risk in seven areas of New
York. 17 It provided that insurers with low risk had to contribute
money into the pool, while .insurers with a high risk would be
entitled to take money from the pool. 18 Petitioners claimed that
10. N.Y. INs. LAW § 3231(a) (McKinney 1992). Part of this section
states:
Any individual, and dependents of such individual, and any small
group, including all'employees of group members and dependents of
employees or members, applying for individual health insurance
coverage, including medicare supplemental insurance, must be accepted
at all times throughout the year for any hospital and/or medical
coverage offered by the insurer to individuals or small groups in this
state.

Id.
11. Id. Part of this section states:
No individual health insurance policy and no group health insurance
policy... shall be issued in this state unless such policy is community
rated .... For the purposes of this section, "community rated" means

a rating methodology in which the premium for all persons covered by a
policy or contract form is the same based on the experience of the entire
pool of risks covered by that policy or contract form without regard to
age, sex, health status or occupation.
Id.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 62, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
Id. at 61, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
Id.
N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. &REGS. tit. 11, §§ 360, 361 (1992).
Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 61, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
Id. at 61, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
18. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & PEGS. tit. 11, § 361.3(e)(3). This section
states:
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this regulation violated their rights under the New York State
Constitution because it "imposes an unconstitutional tax, gives
State money to private organizations and takes property without
just compensation." 19
The appellate division began its analysis by first determining
whether or not the regulation imposed a tax. 20 It decided that
payments into the pool were intended by the Legislature to be
mandatory for all insurers in order to make the danger of high
price claims equal for each insurer. 2 1 As a result, the

For the second and third calendar quarter of 1993, a carrier participating
in a demographic pool as of the beginning of a quarter shall pay to the
demographic pooling fund a percentage of its premiums earned during
each quarter, excluding premiums charged for anticipated payments to
the demographic pooling fund, if its average demographic factor as of
April 1, 1993 is projected to be less than the regional demographic
factor for the pool area.
Id.
19. Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380. The court in this
case decided several issues other than constitutional ones. It determined that
the Legislature did not intend the pooling system to apply only to policies
created after the regulation was enacted, therefore part 361 of title 11 of the
NYCRR was valid even though it applied to policies already in existence. Id.
at 62, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380. It decided that the Legislature did not intend the
regulation to apply only to commercial insurers, hence part 361 of title 11 of
the NYCRR was not invalid even though Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield
took part in the pooling system. Id. at 62-63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380. The court
did, however nullify part 360.3(a)(1)(ii) and 360.4(c), because the
Superintendent exceeded his authority in creating these sections. Id. at 64-65,
617 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
20. Id. at 63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
21. Id. (citing N.Y. INS. LAW §3233(c) (McKinney 1992)). This section
states:
Such regulations shall include reinsurance or a pooling process
involving insurer contributions to, or receipts from, a fund which shall
be designed to share the risk of or equalize high cost claims, claims of
high cost persons, cost variations among insurers and health
maintenance organizations based on demographic factors of the persons
insured which correlate with such cost variations designed to protect
insurers from disproportionate adverse risks of offering coverage to all
applicants.
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Superintendent could be given the power to collect the money. 2 2
The court determined that the Legislature had rightfully invoked
its power to regulate through a pooling system. 2 3 In addition, it
held that the mandate was a regulation, not a tax, because the
24
intent of the Legislature was not to produce profits.
In coming to the conclusion that the pooling system did not
create a tax, the court cited several cases. 2 5 In Health Insurance
Ass'n of America v. Hartnett,2 6 the New York Court of Appeals
stated that the Legislature had the right to create regulations for
the insurance industry. 2 7 Thus it can be inferred that as long as
22. Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380. In support of this
proposition the court cited Greater Poughkeepsie Library Dist. v Town of
Poughkeepsie, 81 N.Y.2d 574, 618 N.E.2d 127, 601 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1993),
which stated that the Legislature has the sole power of taxation which can be
"delegated to legislative bodies of municipalities and quasi municipal
corporations." Id. at 580, 618 N.E.2d at 130, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 97. The court
in this case held that it was unconstitutional for a Library District to be given
the power to tax. Id. at 579, 618 N.E.2d at 130, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 97. The
court also relied on Gautier v. Ditmar, 204 N.Y. 20, 97 N.E. 464 (1912).
which confirmed that:
While it would be incompetent for the legislature to leave to a state
officer or department the power to determine whether a tax should be
levied... it may be lawfully delegated to any ministerial officer or any
department, or its appointee or other appointee other authority, the
power of using the machinery, as and in the method created by it, for
the collection of taxes it has levied.
Id. at 28, 97 N.E. at 467.
23. Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380. See Health Ins.
Ass'n of Am. v. Harness, 44 N.Y.2d 302, 376 N.E.2d 1280, 405 N.Y.S.2d
634 (1978) (stating that regulation of the insurance industry could be done by
the Legislature).
24. Colonial,205 A.D.2d at 63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
25. Id. at 63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
26. 44 N.Y.2d 302, 376 N.E.2d 1280, 405 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1978).
27. Id. at 309, 376 N.E.2d at 1284, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 638. In this case, the
Legislature passed a program that had been submitted by the Governor into
law. The law, entitled the Mandatory Maternity Care Coverage law, provided
that all health insurance policies created after January 1, 1977 had to provide
maternity care coverage. Id. at 306, 376 N.E.2d at 1282, 405 N.Y.S.2d at
636. The insurance companies sued the New York State Superintendent of
Insurance, claiming that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 307, 376
N.E.2d at 1283, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 637. The court declared the statute
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the pooling system is a regulation and not a tax, enacting the
system is within the power of the Superintendent of Insurance.
In United States v. Butler,28 the Supreme Court of the United
States distinguished between a tax and a regulation. 2 9 This case
presented the Court with the question of whether a processing tax
imposed on cotton by the Secretary of Agriculture was valid. 30 In
deciding the case, the Court articulated the rule that revenue
collected by the government which was not used for the general
welfare of the people but was given to a certain group is a
regulation and not a tax. 3 1 The Court came to the conclusion that

it was not a valid tax. 32 In so deciding, the Court stated that:
A tax, in the general understanding of the term, and as used in
the Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the
Government. The word has never been thought to connote the
constitutional as it was within the police power of the state to protect families
fzom the high cost of maternity care. Id. at 309, 376 N.E.2d at 1284, 405
N.Y.S.2d at 638.
28. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
29. Id. at 61.
30. Id.at 57. This case was based on § 9(a) of the Agriculture Adjustment
Act enacted in 1933. Id. at 55. The Act came about as a result of an economic
emergency caused by the enormous difference in price between the price of
agricultural products and other goods. Id. at 53. This threatened a national
public interest and placed a burden on commerce. Id.As a response to the
emergency, the Agriculture Adjustment Act allowed the Secretary of
Agriculture to impose a processing tax on agricultural commodities. Id. at 55.
The purpose of the tax was to raise money for costs that resulted from this
economic emergency. Id. at 55. The tax was to be paid by the processor on the
commodity he was processing. Id. In July of 1933, the Secretary imposed the
processing tax on cotton. Id. at 57.
31. Id. at 61. The Government argued that it was a tax because it was a
measure to raise revenue. Id. at 57. They claimed that the money which was
collected was deposited in the federal treasury and was available to be used for
any reason. Id. The Court, however, concluded that the money they received
from the processors was not available for general use by the government. Id. at
58-59. It stated that the revenue was being given exclusively to farmers so they
would reduce their crops. Id. This was done to help the farmers during this
emergency and to increase the price of their crops. Id. Therefore, since the
money was taken from one group and given to another, it was a regulation and
not a tax. Id.
32. Id. at 61.
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expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of
another. We may concede that the latter sort of imposition is

constitutional when imposed to effectuate regulation as a matter
in which both groups are interested and in respect of which there
is power of legislative regulation. But manifestly no justification
for it can be found unless as an integral part of such
33
regulation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
supported this proposition in San Juan CellularTelephone Co. v.
Public Service Conission of Puerto Rico.3 4 In this case, the
court held that a mandatory periodic fee to be paid by a private
company in order to provide cellular phone service in San Juan
was a regulatory fee as opposed to a tax.35 It stated that tax
money is used for the general good of the public while a
regulatory fee serves a specific purpose. 3 6 The court determined
that because the money from the fee was being used to offset
expenses

incurred

by

the

Puerto

Rico

Public

Service

Commission, it was not being spent on the entire community and

37
hence was not a tax.
In addition, the New York Court of Appeals in Medical

Malpractice Insurance Ass'n v. Superintendent of Insurance of
33. Id.
34. 967 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1992). In this case, the Federal
Communications Commission allowed a government firm and a private firm to
supply San Juan with cellular phone service. Id. at 684. The private firm,
however, had to pay 3% of its gross profits to the Public Service Commission
of Puerto Rico in order to obtain their license. Id. The private firm argued that
the fee was a tax. Id. at 684-85.
35. Id. at 686.
36. Id. at 685. The court stated:
The classic "tax" is imposed by a legislature upon many, or all,
citizens. It raises money, contributed to a general fund, and spent for
the benefit of the entire community. The classic "regulatory fee" is
imposed by an agency upon those subject to its regulation. It may serve
regulatory purposes directly by, for example, deliberately discouraging
particular conduct by making it more expensive. Or, it may serve such
purposes indirectly by, for example, raising money placed in a special
fumd to help defray the agency's regulation-related expenses.
Id. (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 685-86.
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New York 38 upheld a surcharge imposed by the Superintendent of

Insurance on medical malpractice insurance. 39 In this case, the
money collected from the surcharge would have been used by the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Association if the insurance rates
they were charging turned out to be insufficient. 40 The court held
that this was a valid regulation of insurance. 41 Based on these
decisions, the court in Colonial came to the conclusion that the
pool was not a tax, 42 presumably because the money being
collected from low risk insurers and redistributed to high risk
insurers was being given to a specific group and was not being
used for the general welfare of the public.

Next the court addressed whether distributing the pooled money

to private insurance companies with a high risk of loss was a
violation of article VII section 8(1) of the New York State
Constitution. 43 This section of the State Constitution prohibits the
state from loaning or giving money to private corporations. 44 The
court came to the conclusion that the pooling system did not
violate this constitutional provision in a two step analysis. 4 5
38. 72 N.Y.2d 753, 533 N.E.2d 1030, 537 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989).
39. Id. at 763, 533 N.E.2d at 1035, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 6. The Medical
Malpractice Insurance Association [hereinafter MMIA] was created in 1975 as
a non-profit organization whose goal was to provide doctors with reasonable
malpractice insurance. Id. at 757, 533 N.E.2d at 1031, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 2. In
this case, pursuant to the Medical Malpractice Act of 1986, the Superintendent
of Insurance set up rates which could be charged by the MMIA for their
policies. Id. at 758, 533 N.E.2d at 1031, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 2. He was also
authorized to impose a surcharge on this insurance of up to 8% if the rates
proved to be inadequate. Id. at 758, 533 N.E.2d at 1032, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
The MMIA opposed these regulations on the grounds that they were
unconstitutional. Id. at 759, 533 N.E.2d at 1032-33, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
40. Id. at 758, 533 N.E.2d at 1032, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
41. Id. at 763, 533 N.E.2d at 1035, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 6. In this case, the
question of whether the surcharge on insurance was a tax never came up
presumably because the money was not being used for the general welfare of
the public. Therefore, it could not be a tax because it was being given to the
MMIA.
42. Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
43. Id. at 63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
44. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8(1).
45. Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 63-64, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380-81.
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First, the court acknowledged that the New York State
Constitution provides that no requirement of the constitution can
take the power away from the Legislature to guard people from
the danger of sickness by providing insurance. 4 6 Accordingly,
the Legislature instructed the Superintendent to create a
regulation that would protect New Yorkers in this manner. 47
Therefore, because the Legislature gave the Superintendent the
power to create the pooling system to protect New York citizens
from the high cost of insurance, he had the right to give the
pooled money to private insurance companies, regardless of the
48
prohibition of giving state money to private corporations.
Hence, the pooling system was not a violation of article VII
49
section 8(1) of the New York State Constitution.
The last constitutional issue the court sought to answer was
whether the pooling system constituted taking property without
adequate compensation. 50 In deciding that the p'ooling system
instituted by the Superintendent does not involve an
unconstitutional taking of property, the court cited Rochester Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Connissionof New York. 5 1 In
46. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8(2). This section states that "[s]ubject to the
limitations or indebtedness and taxation, nothing in this constitution contained
shall prevent the legislature from providing for... the protection by insurance
or otherwise, against... sickness." Id.
47. Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
48. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8(l).
49. Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 63-64, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380-81.
50. Id. at 63-64, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380-81.
51. 71 N.Y.2d 313, 520 N.E.2d 528, 525 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1988). This
case stemmed from a finding by the Public Service Commission of New York
that a large amount of natural gas within the state was unavailable because
small local producers could not get the gas to their customers. Id. at 318, 520
N.E.2d at 529, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 810. As a result, the Legislature gave the
Commission the power to order gas utilities to traniport gas to customers from
the local producers if they had extra room in their pipelines. Id. at 318, 520
N.E.2d at 529, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. sued
the Commission claiming that their property was taken without just
compensation because they were forced to allow the public to use their
pipelines. Id. at 319, 520 N.E.2d at 530, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 811. The court
concluded that there was no constitutional violation. Id. at 317, 520 N.E.2d at
529, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
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this case, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that a
private corporation could be regulated by the Legislature
"through the exercise of police power to promote the general
welfare." 52 The court stated that while the Legislature could
regulate private corporations, if the regulation impermissibly
affects the expectations or economic interests of the corporation,
it would be considered an unconstitutional taking. 53 The court
listed three factors to be considered in making this
determination. 54 These include: the financial impact of the
government regulation; the public purpose for the regulation; and
whether the expectations of the corporation had been thwarted. 55
The court thus held that the regulation which required gas utilities
to transport gas to their customers from local producers, if they

had extra room in their pipelines, was not an unconstitutional
taking because it did not interfere with the plaintiff's
expectations, it had little economic effect on the plaintiff, and it
did not require the plaintiff to do anything other than its original
function of transporting gas. 56 The court also cited Birnbaum v.
State57 which stated that in order to decide whether an
52. Id. at 321, 520 N.E.2d at 531-32, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 813. The court
stated that "the Constitution does not guarantee citizens the unrestricted
privilege of conducting or engaging in business as they please. The State may,
in the reasonable exercise of its police power, condition or restrict private
businesses or prohibit the operation of some businesses entirely to further its
policies." Id. at 322, 520 N.E.2d at 532, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 813 (citations
omitted).
53. Id. at 324, 520 N.E.2d at 533, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 324-25, 520 N.E.2d at 533-34, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 815-16.
57. 73 N.Y.2d 638, 541 N.E.2d 23, 543 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1078 (1990). In this case, the executors of the decedent's
estate wanted to sell the nursing home that was part of the estate because it was
operating at a loss. Id. at 641-42, 541 N.E.2d at 24, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 24. The
State filed suit to prevent the nursing home from closing until it gave notice to
the next of kin of each patient and received the Commissioner of Health's
approval. Id. at 642, 541 N.E.2d at 24, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 24. The
Commissioner was appointed as the receiver to run the nursing home by the
supreme court. Id. at 643, 541 N.B.2d at 25, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 25. The
executors of the decedent's estate claimed that property was taken from them
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unconstitutional taking had in fact occurred, it must "assess
whether respondents were alone required to shoulder a public
burden which, in fairness, should have been the responsibility of
58
the public as a whole."
The Colonial court considered these holdings when it held that
there was no unconstitutional taking of property. They evaluated
the three factors listed in Rochester Gas in deciding whether an
unconstitutional taking had occurred and decided that the private
insurance companies who had to contribute to the pool would not
be adversely affected, economically or otherwise. The court also
affirmed the reasoning of the trial court in rendering ils
decision. 59 The trial court reasoned that the insurance companies
could obtain just compensation if they increased their rates to
cover the amount they had to contribute to the pool. 6 0 Therefore,
the court determined "that there has not been an unconstitutional
taking of what petitioner contends is its low-risk value of its book
of business." 61 The aforementioned reasons led the court to
conclude that the state had not taken money from the insurance
companies without just compensation.
The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution also states
that "private property [shall not] be taken without just
compensation. "62 As the law currently stands, there seems to be
no noticeable difference between the Federal Constitution and the
New York State Constitution on this issue. The Supreme Court of
the United States has resolved this issue in a similar manner. In
Yee v. City of Escondido,63 the Court held that if the government
without just compensation by virtue of the fact that they were forced to stay in
business, id. at 644, 541 N.E.2d at 25, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 25, and operate at a
loss. Id. at 645, 541 N.E.2d at 26, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 26. The court concluded
that there was no unconstitutional taking. Id. at 647, 541 .N.E.2d at 27, 543
N.Y.S.2d at 27.
58. Id. at 645, 541 N.E.2d at 26, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
59. Colonial,205 A.D.2d at 63, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
60. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Curiale, 159 Misc. 2d 221, 225, 603

N.Y.S.2d 263, 266 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1993).
61. Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 63, 617 N.Y.S. at 380.
62. U.S CONST. amend V.
63. 112 S.Ct. 1522 (1992). In this case, the people of Escondido in
California passed an ordinance that fixed rent levels and forbade rent increases
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does not take physical possession of the property and only
regulates how it can be used, the government is not required to
provide compensation unless "considerations such as the purpose
of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of
economic use of the property suggests that the regulation has
unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that
should be borne by the public as a whole." 64 Since the federal
standard seems to be closely linked to the state standard for
taking without just compensation, this case would probably be
decided in a similar fashion under the Fifth Amendment. 65
The appellate division upheld all three constitutional challenges
to the pooling system created by the Superintendent of
Insurance. 66 The only similar challenge that could have been
made under the Federal Constitution would have been a Fifth
Amendment claim of taking property without just compensation.
The federal 67 and state 68 standards to find this type of
constitutional violation are similar in that they both focus on the
purpose for the regulation and the extent to which the property
owner is denied access to his property. Because the standards are
so similar, it is likely that no constitutional violation would be
found under the Fifth Amendment, since none was found under
the New York Constitution. Therefore, the court determined that
the insurance pooling system should be upheld as constitutional.

in mobliehome parks absent City Council approval. Id. at 1526-27. The
plaintiffs filed suit on the grounds that their property had been taken from
them unlawfully. Id.
64. Id at 1526. The Court decided that there was no per se taking in this
case but left the issue if it was a regulatory taking to the courts of California.
Id. at 1534.

65.
66.
67.
68.

U.S CONST. amend V.
Colonial, 205 A.D.2d at 63-64, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
See Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 71

N.Y.2d 313, 520 N.E.2d 528, 525 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1988).
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